Beaten On Most Fronts, Syria's Secular Revolutionaries Are Running Out Of Hope

ALEPPO, Syria — “The experience has failed in Syria’s north [Idlib and Aleppo governorates]. The eastern regions are controlled by ISIS. The south is the only thing left,” says a Syrian revolution activist sitting in a café, asking those around him what else can make the revolution work.

Any idea could be useful at this stage, and any proposal might help things edge forward in an extremely complicated situation where individual efforts have become totally ineffective. 

Fronts in Syria are divided according to the routes used to provide supplies to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other fighters. Until recently, the northern front encompassed Syria’s eastern regions, including Raqqa and Deir Ezzor.

Supplies in these regions came through Syria’s north, which enjoyed open and relatively easy communication routes with Turkey before the Islamic State (IS) took over Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and some regions to the east of Aleppo. The southern front, by contrast, extends from southern Homs and Qalamoun to Damascus, the Golan, and Daraa. It spreads over vast swathes of Syria and is mainly supplied via Jordan.

Turkey controls military and civilian aid in northern Syria, while the United States and Saudi Arabia have reached an agreement with Jordan allowing them to bring in aid and prevent an uncontrolled influx of fighters from all over the world into Syria.

Petty Games 

Confusing Gulf relations have manipulated the revolution.

This is not news as such, but so much of it has gone on that it has killed broad hopes pinned on the northern front, according to one activist.

Turkey also played the manipulation game and supported parties that ultimately proved unable to rise up to such hopes. This goes without mentioning that it allowed Islamists from all over the world to enter Syria, and supported groups that ended up supporting and joining the IS.

In the meantime, activists say that the opposition — as represented by the National Council, the Coalition, and the provisional government — is totally out of touch with reality and that its role was over before it even started, involved as it is in endless internal political and ethical conflicts, to say nothing of some of the utterly childish proposals some of its representatives have put forth.  

Dealings with the Military Operations Center have turned many opposition commanders and cadres into mere informants for the CIA. Their mission is thus limited to providing the CIA with information on the IS while faction commanders have become professional thieves.

The CIA has a database that is continuously fed, albeit at the expense of revolutionary cadres and fighting groups which are now waiting for some direct or indirect U.S. support that will alter the balance of force. Meanwhile, the IS and Syrian regime forces act as if they control their own decision-making in terms of attacking and retreating.

In this overcast scene, self-described pro-opposition figures living in Damascus, such as Louay Hussein, tour Western embassies — British, French, etc. — trying to sell their initiatives. Western capitals seeking any kind of solution ask opposition figures who are genuinely involved in the revolution for their opinion and the answer comes in the shape of the following question: “Who or what will act as a guarantor?” 

Is there anyone in these embassies who can guarantee that the initiatives pertaining to Bashar al-Assad, or any figure in his regime, will actually be implemented? As one person who was asked for his opinion on an initiative formulated last week put it: “You have to reach an understanding with Russia first. It is not Iran, Damascus, Paris or Washington, but rather the Russian authorities that can provide guarantees.”

According to a Syrian activist with well-established connections in Western capitals, “the West still misunderstands the Syrian regime. The Syrian regime and Bashar al-Assad cannot be disassociated from one another, but for some reason the West is unable to see that.”

The Southern Front

Regardless of what Western capitals are able or unable to see, they — and especially Washington — still control the conflict in Syria remotely. This conflict would not have gone on so long had it not been for U.S. President Barack Obama’s lukewarm response to and hesitation over Syria.

It seems that Syria is an anxiety-inducing issue, even though some in the Departments of State and Defense eagerly back indirect intervention in the country. 

As a result of the failure to meet with US representatives in the region and in Washington, many opposition figures from outside the traditional political groups (the National Council, the Coalition and the provisional government) are now proposing a unification of fighting factions along the southern front, at least those sizeable enough to hoist a revolution banner without painting it black.

Obstacles And Ambitions

Simple though the concept is, attempts to unify local fighting forces and upgrade their command and organization will prove highly challenging.

It will be difficult to convince anyone within the domestic Syrian opposition that they can be united, let alone accept representation abroad. The opposition abroad may well try to propose initiatives, hold forums and meetings, and request appointments with European, Arab and U.S. politicians, but this will not alter the opinion of the opposition on the ground, one that is shared by most Syrian citizens still in Syria.

No one outside the opposition will be easily convinced that the same domestic opposition can act as a national front, either, or that they will not behead people, commit war crimes, or sell their weapons to Jabhat al-Nusra or the IS.

The FSA outside Syria has no control over the forces inside Syria, and when it does manage some degree of control, it remains ineffective. Much like other factions, those forces fighting under the FSA banner domestically are indeed easily capable of becoming arms dealers.

It would also take a miracle for local fighters and commanders to be content with simply being liberators. A potential liberation could result in connecting Daraa to Damascus and changing the course of the revolution, provided fighters do not become politicized or Islamist, but no one should assume that liberated regions would be subsequently governed by components of the Syrian people, opposed to “a Sunni state guaranteed by fighting forces.”

Another obstacle is the need to determine priorities. Toppling the regime remains the top priority even if the whole world believes that the real danger lies in confronting the IS. Solutions exclusively based on striking the Nusra Front and the IS will merely prolong the suffering of civilians instead of putting an end to the beheadings and theft of Syrian resources.

Some key Syrian revolutionary commanders have decided to abide by that last option, but their optimism will be very difficult to sustain, and trying to regain control of the revolution’s priorities will indeed mandate an extremely high level of credibility.

Meanwhile, field activists recount that Islamist forces continue to step up assassinations against cadres who could actually move things towards a positive end.

A few days ago, an FSA commander, upon whom high expectations had been pinned in the Daraa region, was assassinated for reasons still unknown in an operation carried out in such a manner as to avoid any accusation of jihadist involvement.

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