The deployment of Russian military forces to Syria is a major geostrategic inflection.
Its significance goes far beyond the situation in Syria. It may well herald, in fact, a new era in global geopolitics and security.
Russian forces are establishing an airbase likely to become capable of conducting operations throughout the Levant and the Eastern Mediterranean.
It would be the first time in history that Russia had an outpost on land for projecting force beyond the confines of the Black Sea. The U.S. and NATO must consider and respond to this development recognizing its true stakes.
The Obama Administration remains inexplicably bewildered, however.
Secretary of State John Kerry stated on 22 September that the Russian equipment that had arrived in Syria was there to protect Russian forces. “We don’t yet have clarity with respect to the Russian effort,” he noted in a press conference.
After Kerry’s meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on 27 September, the State Department stated: “Again, we’re just at the beginning of trying to understand what the Russians’ intentions are in Syria, in Iraq, and to try to see if there are mutually beneficial ways forward here.”
Understanding the Kremlin’s intentions at a basic level is not really very hard, though. Russian President Vladimir Putin certainly means to deter the U.S.-led coalition from attacking the forces of Syrian President Bashar al Assad, establishing any sort of no-fly zone, or taking any meaningful action that might harm Assad’s forces.
He also means to forge a counter-alliance consisting of Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanese Hezbollah and demonstrate that his coalition is more effective than the West’s.
He intends, finally, to establish a permanent foothold in the Middle East from which he can threaten NATO’s southern flank directly, project power into the Mediterranean and the Arab World, and generally re-create Russia’s aura as a global power.
He may have more complicated objectives in mind as well, but the State Department should be able at least to recognize these. Americans should not fall for Putin’s “active measures,” a phrase he used in his interview with Charlie Rose on 60 Minutes to dismiss as falsehoods descriptions of the Assad regime’s brutality against the Syrian people.
One must reckon with such an aptitude for falsehood when hearing Putin state, “we do not have any obsession with being a superpower in the international arena.”
And one must hear the threat in statements such as, “Russia will not participate in any troop operations in the territory of Syria or in any other states. Well, at least we don’t plan on it right now….”
Impact of Russian depolyment in Syria
The Russian deployment severely constrains Western options within Syria and may come to challenge America’s ability to continue to operate in Iraq as well.
Russian aircraft flying around Syria give Moscow absolute veto power over any attempt to establish any sort of no-fly zone or ISIS-free zone, unless the U.S. and its partners are prepared to risk aerial combat with the Russian Air Force. Russian planes can escort Syrian Air Force (SAF) aircraft on missions, fly combat air patrols (CAP) to protect Syrian helicopters engaged in barrel-bombing, and harass U.S. or NATO aircraft or drones attempting to enforce ISIS-free zones.
Putin is likely trying to guarantee that the U.S. cannot attack the Assad regime effectively now or in the future. The Russian presence alone helps to deter any strikes against Assad. If the U.S. begins to coordinate its air operations with the Russians (see below), and the Russians remain tightly allied with Assad, it stands to reason that Moscow will pass along to Damascus warning of any potential U.S. attack.
Considering the increasing closeness of the Russia-Iran relationship, we can assume that Putin would provide a similar benefit to Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah forces on the ground in Syria. The Iraqi military has already announced that it will share intelligence with Syria, Russia, and Iran.
Russian force composition in Syria and its implications
The composition of Russian forces deployed to Syria is absurdly large to be simply protecting Russian civilian and military positions already there. It is, rather, consistent with the mission of providing air support to Assad regime ground forces fighting against the rebels.
Su- 25 (Frogfoot) ground-attack aircraft comprise the majority of the fixed-wing airframes visible on the ground at Bassel al Assad airfield near Latakia on the Syrian coast. These planes are similar to U.S. Air Force A-10s in that they were designed to fly low and slow to provide close-air support (CAS) to ground forces engaged with enemy units.
The Mi-24 Hind helicopter is a large attack platform that performs a role similar to that of the U.S. Apache, except that the Hind is much larger and, unlike the Apache, can carry troops and supplies as well as conduct groundattack missions. These are among the premier Russian airframes for supporting troops in contact.
They have limited combat radii (400 kilometers or less) and so would not be ideal for operations beyond the line from roughly Qusayr in the south to Idlib in the north from their current position. They could be moved to other Syrian regime airbases, particularly Damascus and Der ez Zour to support operations in southern or eastern Syria.
They pose a very limited threat to U.S., forces, Turkey, Jordan, or Israel from Latakia. Moscow has also positioned a smaller number of Su-24 Fencer and Su-30 Flanker multirole fighters at Latakia, however. The Fencer is an old airframe used mainly for longer-range groundattack missions. Its combat radius is sufficient to cover much of Syria from the base at Latakia and to range into the Eastern Mediterranean as well.
It can conduct long-range strike missions against specific targets or aerial reconnaissance. It is not a serious threat to the ability of U.S., NATO, or Israeli air forces to operate freely throughout the region, however, nor is it particularly survivable against advanced surface-to-air missiles. The Flanker is another story entirely.
Its radius of action is several thousand kilometers, and it is very well-designed for aerial maneuvering, making it much more able to avoid SAMs and theoretically more capable of contesting airspace against limited numbers of less-proficient Western aircraft. It can be used for strike operations anywhere throughout the Levant and can also perform reconnaissance missions over a wide area.
Conclusion
The Russian deployment to Syria is a serious blow to the U.S., its allies, and its prospects for developing and executing any plausible strategy to defeat ISIS and al Qaeda in the Levant and Iraq. It is likely the thin edge of the wedge, moreover, that will offer Putin greater opportunities to disrupt American operations in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.
The path of least resistance for the U.S. will be gradually coming to terms with the new reality and making a virtue of necessity by cooperating, reluctantly at first and then more enthusiastically, with the RussianIranian-Syrian axis that is now forming. It will, in other words, continue the trend of realigning the American geostrategic position the Middle East fundamentally.
More remarkably, it may represent the opening of a new Russian flank against NATO and against America’s ability to operate in the region. If so, it will be much easier to resist or deflect this Russian adventure now, at its beginning and when it is very limited, than to reverse it some years hence after it has taken firm root.
SEE ALSO: Putin’s power plays are all about the appearance of influence he craves
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