[This is a follow-up post to Al Qaeda needs a new 'general manager']
Support for Jabhat al Nusra (JN) among local populations and armed groups in Syria re-emerged clearly after US strikes targeted JN-linked member sof an operational al-Qaeda cell in Syria popularly described as the “Khorasan Group.”
The targeting of these individuals in Syria triggered protests against the US and prompted numerous rebel brigades to release statements of condemnation.
This was the second notable demonstration of rebel support for JN in Syria. The first occurred as numerous elements of the Syrian opposition protested the US decision to designate JN as a foreign terrorist organization in December 2012. JN’s successful competition with ISIS for the allegiance of Syrian rebel brigades offers a compelling example to other al-Qaeda affiliates currently under threat of ISIS predation such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Zawahiri may therefore choose to elevate Joulani in order to position Joulani to export his approach to other al-Qaeda affiliates.
There have been reports of direct communication from Zawahiri to Joulani. If true, they may indicate that Zawahiri is reinforcing Joulani’s leadership position in Syria and Joulani’s commitment to the paradigm Zawahiri seeks to export.
They may also indicate that Zawahiri has begun to groom Joulani for future leadership in al-Qaeda. Zawahiri sent a letter to Joulani in early 2015 for the first time since mid-2013, according to two “well-connected Syrian Islamists” with links to JN.
The letter reportedly included a detailed set of guidance to Joulani regarding the necessary aspects of JN’s strategy in Syria, including instructions for Joulani “to better integrate his movement within the Syrian revolution and its people; to coordinate more closely with all Islamic groups on the ground; to contribute towards the establishment of a Syria-wide Sharia judicial court system; and to use strategic areas of the country to build a sustainable Al-Qaeda power base.”
Zawahiri’s engagement, if accurately reported, reaffirms many of the lines of effort that JN is currently pursuing in Syria and classifies them as requirements for the success of al-Qaeda as a whole.
Zawahiri likely sought to bolster Joulani’s authority by overtly recognizing the value of his approach. Joulani appeared to confirm his receipt of Zawhiri’s guidance during his recent al-Jazeera interview, in which he stated that JN’s focus on the defeat of the Assad regime adheres to Zawahiri’s direct orders.
Joulani may seek more direct oversight from Zawahiri as JN approaches new thresholds of success. JN is entering a new phase in Syria as a result of its successes to date.
This may require Joulani to make difficult decisions regarding how to navigate increasingly complex relationships with Syrian rebels or how to proceed with governance. Joulani has different options for how to advance JN’s interests in Syria, including renouncing al-Qaeda in order to receive funding from Gulf States or merging with ISIS in order to benefit from the group’s prestige.
Growing rebel pressure on JN to relinquish its al-Qaeda affiliation may furthermore prompt some JN members to contemplate breaking with al-Qaeda, requiring Joulani to convince JN members of the necessity of their current allegiance to al-Qaeda.
JN’s approach to its relationship with rebel brigades has historically been a subject of contention between Joulani’s advisors, and the issue could become more divisive in coming months if competition with ISIS increases.
Joulani may seek, or may have sought, additional affirmation of his authority by Zawahiri in order to quell internal dissent and enable him to maintain his current strategy in Syria without risking internal fragmentation.
Joulani reportedly distributed Zawahiri’s recent letter across JN’s leadership structure, suggesting that the letter enabled Joulani to address rising discontent by asserting his status as an integrated member of the al-Qaeda network.
Further promotion of Joulani within al-Qaeda ranks could buffer JN against fragmentation and enable Joulani to succeed in navigating future ISIS conflict.
Joulani’s visible role as the leader of a successful al- Qaeda affiliate does not necessarily indicate that he qualifies for future leadership within the organization, nor does his prominence alone signify an overall ascent by al-Qaeda’s newest generation.
But there may be little direct indication of the rise of a new generation of al-Qaeda leaders prior to their appointment. Zawhiri will likely seek to minimize the transparency of his calculus for the regeneration of al-Qaeda leadership in order to protect candidates from immediate US targeting.
It is therefore important to consider visible candidates such as Joulani in order to explore the implications of a change in al-Qaeda’s method of leadership regeneration for the ultimate success of the War on Terror.
The elevation of Joulani, or any member of the new generation he represents, into a leadership role within al-Qaeda would require Zawahiri to undertake an organizational shift.
Zawahiri would need to depart from past reliance on a set of al-Qaeda members who were the original companions of Osama bin Laden or members of the former mujahideen era in Afghanistan.
Zawahiri initially departed from tradition in 2013 by appointing Wahayshi as his deputy, at the time greatly increasing the importance of Wahayshi’s franchise, AQAP, to the central organization. This may demonstrate flexibility in Zawahiri’s strategic calculus that could lead to future departures from al-Qaeda leadership norms.
The challenges that al-Qaeda faces from successful counter- terrorism strikes by the US, such as the strike that killed Wahayshi, and ISIS’s predation on al-Qaeda affiliated and associated groups may render future shifts by Zawahiri increasingly likely.
Zawahiri could pursue this change by altering the types of leadership positions available to al-Qaeda members or the sets of responsibilities that certain leaders possess. He could also do so by changing the requirements for leadership candidacy.
It nonetheless remains possible that al-Qaeda will continue to elevate leaders in a more classical fashion, prioritizing, for example, those commanders with past experience working with Wahayshi or a personal history with bin Laden. Zawahiri is furthermore likely to weigh potential increases in his engagement with Joulani against the requirements for preserving and augmenting JN’s success in Syria.
It is likely that Zawahiri will choose to leave Joulani in place in order to avoid potentially disrupting JN’s efforts in Syria. Zawahiri could instead choose to elevate one of JN’s high-echelon strategic advisors such as Abu Firas al-Suri or Sanafi Nasr, who have historic ties to bin Laden. Zawahiri initially sent these two men, among a number of JN’s current advisors, to Syria in mid-2013 to advise Joulani and act as intermediaries between JN and ISIS as the schism between the two groups widened.
It is possible that Zawahiri also sought to provide these individuals with valuable experience at the helm of a preeminent al-Qaeda affiliate in order to groom them for future leadership. In either case, Joulani’s status will remain unchallenged as a formidable al-Qaeda commander whose success and leadership will likely influence the behavior of other affiliates and define the course of al-Qaeda’s evolution over the coming years and possibly decades.
Zawahiri’s plans to attack the West likely affect his calculus regarding how to regenerate al-Qaeda leadership. In his recent al-Jazeera interview, Joulani stated that JN suspended its involvement in plans to attack against the West in accordance with Zawahiri’s instruction. This admission does not mean that al-Qaeda no longer seeks to damage the West, and it is possible that Zawahiri has simply transferred operational cells back to Yemen.
It could indicate, however, that Zawahiri seeks to preserve Joulani for future leadership by removing him from immediate US target lists. Zawahiri may calculate that the US will halt its targeting of al-Qaeda members in Syria if he suspends JN’s involvement in efforts to conduct an immediate attack against the West.
Although initial strikes targeting JN-linked members in Syria actually provided momentum to JN’s anti-US narrative, subsequent strikes have reportedly killed key members of the organization, such as JN’s military commander Abu Hammam al-Shami, and may threaten to disrupt JN’s operations. Zawahiri may have decided to halt al-Qaeda’s near-term efforts to attack the West in order to avoid prompting an expansion of US strikes that could damage JN’s successes in Syria.
Zawahiri likely seeks to capitalize upon JN’s embedded position within Syrian rebel ranks in order to achieve longer-term strategic positioning against the US According to unconfirmed reports, members of the JN- linked “Khorasan Cell” directly participated in JN-led offensives that seized control of most of Idlib Province from March to June 2015.
It is unclear whether this involvement included Khorasan members dispatched from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, who may have relocated to Yemen.
More likely, JN members associated with the Khorasan cell who remained behind sought to demonstrate their commitment to the Syrian revolution against Assad.
JN’s current positioning within rebel ranks, enabled by such demonstrations of support, positions al-Qaeda to undertake preparations to attack US-trained rebels when they are inserted into Syria or to leverage local support to ensure that al- Qaeda fills the void left behind by the defeat of ISIS.
Both courses of action could provide al-Qaeda with an effective and sustainable narrative that positions the group as a counter-US force while complicating the ability of the US and its allies to act directly against the organization without harming the intended allies of the US in Syria.
Joulani is a natural leader to exemplify the potential benefits of this strategy, and halting JN’s involvement in active al-Qaeda attack cells could provide Joulani the necessary space to pursue this effort.
IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
The singular focus of US counterterrorism operations on traditional candidates for al-Qaeda leadership risks obscuring the potential threat posed by effective leaders of al-Qaeda affiliates who have potential to rise to leadership within the organization.
The US must evaluate its strategy against al-Qaeda in the context of current realities and recognize the developing trends within the organization that could require the US to adopt a more comprehensive approach.
Under current conditions, JN will likely continue to experience success in its effort to convince Syrian rebels and civilian populations that al-Qaeda is a true ally in their fight against Assad.
Embedded al-Qaeda presence within popular movements in Syria and elsewhere in the region will increasingly render counterterrorism strikes such as the one that killed Wahayshi unviable for several reasons: the proliferation of al-Qaeda groups, their depth of leadership, the lack of indigenous partner governments from which drones can be based in a region of failed states, and the condemnation these strikes will generate within local populations associated with insurgencies.
Al- Qaeda’s strategic competition with ISIS also underscores the fact that the US must carefully nest its strategy against al-Qaeda within wider efforts to combat ISIS in order to avoid the indirect empowerment of another strategically dangerous jihadist threat in the wake of ISIS.
The US must therefore develop a comprehensive strategy to address the threats posed by the global jihadist movement as a whole. The US could achieve strategic success against al-Qaeda by regaining the narrative in Syria and supplanting al-Qaeda as the ally of Syrian rebels against Assad.
If combined with counterterrorism operations against JN’s leadership, such a policy may sufficiently disrupt the success achieved by JN in Syria to alter Zawahiri’s calculus going forward. It is a costly approach, but one that is worth considering in the context of the potential long-term cost of allowing al- Qaeda to play a defining role in the evolution of Syria’s devastated society.
Intervention to end the Syrian war while marginalizing JN is furthermore likely a necessary precondition for the eventual defeat of ISIS, as continued war in Syria will facilitate ISIS’s effort to remain. If US- led operations against ISIS succeed in disrupting ISIS globally, there is also a risk that al-Qaeda affiliates will fill the void.
Even in that case, the U.S must carefully examine the rest of al-Qaeda’s global network and the insurgencies on which it rests symbiotically in order to assess the likelihood that other affiliates will successfully adopt Zawahiri’s paradigm and set conditions for their own long-term success.
Nevertheless, the US must ensure that JN, currently the most successful of al-Qaeda’s franchises, does not gain control of a state or a global, ideological, and religious movement.
Jennifer Cafarella is a Syrian Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War Twitter: @TheStudyofWar
SEE ALSO: Al Qaeda needs a new 'general manager'
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