The death of al-Qaeda’s general manager, Nasir al-Wahayshi, will likely disrupt al-Qaeda’s global operations until he is replaced.
It is likely that al-Qaeda leader Aymen al-Zawahiri will nominate his replacement according to traditional leadership patterns, choosing, for example, a former companion of Osama bin Laden. It is dangerous but plausible, however, that Zawahiri will seek to maximize the influence of newer al-Qaeda leaders who have proven their qualifications on the battlefield in order to shepherd the reemergence of a reinvigorated and highly resilient global al-Qaeda organization with a leadership structure that is embedded within local affiliates.
One possible candidate for future al-Qaeda leadership is Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, the leader of al- Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra. If al-Qaeda shifts away from its current reliance on a core cadre of eligible members for leadership, the US must fundamentally adjust its current paradigm for limited counterterror operations in the effort to disrupt and eventually defeat al-Qaeda.
Al Qaeda picks a new GM
The al-Qaeda organization suffered a major blow with the confirmed death of Nasir al-Wahayshi in a US drone strike in Yemen in early June 2015. Wahayshi was the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda’s general manager.
The exact role of the general manager is unclear under al-Qaeda leader Aymen al-Zawahiri, who assumed command of the organization after Osama bin Laden’s death in 2011, but has historically involved the coordination of military and media activities across al-Qaeda’s global affiliates in addition to planning attacks against the West.
Zawahiri may replace Wahayshi as general manager. He may draw from the traditional cadre of bin Laden’s original companions and the al-Qaeda members who fought against the US after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. This set of leaders is dwindling under US pressure, however.
Wahayshi’s death is therefore likely to disrupt al-Qaeda’s ability to manage its global affiliates, at least until a successor is appointed or until the organization adapts to manage its global operations differently.
A new potential leadership cadre is emerging at the helm of successful al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. These individuals do not qualify for leadership in al-Qaeda according to historic paradigms because they were not companions of Osama bin Laden. They may nonetheless provide Zawahiri with new options to replace Wahayshi or otherwise absorb his death if Zawahiri is willing to depart from past traditions.
Even though these commanders do not have the same set of credentials as typical al-Qaeda leaders, many of them fought US forces during the 2003-2008 Iraq War or in Afghanistan after bin Laden’s initial resistance in Tora Bora. These individuals offer Zawahiri a promising source of future leadership within al-Qaeda because of their battlefield experience and, in many cases, their demonstrated commitment to fighting the US.
Because some of these commanders have extensive regional networks, they may furthermore offer Zawahiri new opportunities for pursuing al-Qaeda’s objectives beyond the specific theater in which they currently operate. Changed circumstances, such as ISIS’s rise to preeminence within the global jihad, may also prompt Zawahiri to alter al-Qaeda’s typical leadership patterns in order to adapt to new requirements.
Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, the leader of al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), is a prominent example of this new generation of potential leaders.
The Syrian Civil War's jihadist mastermind
According to open-source accounts Joulani is a Syrian national who joined al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in order to fight the US during the Iraq War. Joulani was subsequently dispatched to Syria to establish a new al-Qaeda affiliate as an offshoot of AQI during Ramadan in 2011, as the Syrian revolution was becoming violent. Joulani and his companions recruited heavily from the Syrian countryside after entering Syria and quickly established a skilled rank-and-file comprised predominantly of local Syrians, later augmented by a steady flow of foreign fighters.
Once established, JN launched a series of effective spectacular attacks against the Syrian regime, acquiring immediate prestige just as the Syrian armed opposition began to mobilize. This positioned JN as a leading force in the fight against Bashar al-Assad within the first two years of the Syrian Civil War.
JN steadily capitalized on this initial success in order to deepen its influence within Syrian rebel ranks as the conflict continued to escalate. JN demonstrated the extent of its influence within rebel ranks from October 2014 to February 2015 by escalating directly against two US-supported rebel brigades in northern Syria, the Syrian Revolutionaries Front and Harakat Hazm. JN forced the dissolution of both groups without generating considerable backlash by other rebel groups, a marker of JN’s rank among the rebels.
Joulani is an effective implementer of Zawahiri’s paradigm for jihad, which contrasts starkly with the methodology implemented by ISIS’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his predecessor, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Zawahiri maintains bin Laden’s vision of the establishment an Islamic caliphate that stretches across the Muslim world and reverses the perceived decline of the Muslim community. As an interim and conditions-setting step, Zawahiri prioritizes the acquisition of popular support by al-Qaeda affiliates above other short-term objectives. This is an inverse of ISIS’s brutal methodology, which succeeds in asserting ISIS control at the expense of social support.
Counter to ISIS, Zawahiri advocates a form of jihad that positions al-Qaeda at the helm of local insurgencies within Muslim-majority countries, fighting against repressive state regimes. Zawahiri then intends to leverage al-Qaeda’s contribution to these insurgencies to mold them over time and emerge at the forefront of a Muslim community united against the West.
JN seeks to create an Islamic emirate in Syria that possesses widespread social support and can be incorporated into the envisioned al-Qaeda caliphate. Joulani pursues this objective using a calibrated and patient strategy to leverage military contributions to the war against Assad alongside social outreach to acquire the support of local communities and the dependence of Syrian rebel powerbrokers.
JN intends to use this support to transform Syrian society in its own image over time, for example by conducting religious outreach to transform the religious beliefs of Syrians according to al-Qaeda’s interpretation of Islam.
This dual approach represents the careful implementation of Zawahiri’s paradigm within the unique environment in Syria. JN’s success is therefore an important test case that demonstrates that Zawahiri’s methodology can be tailored to maximize influence within a given social environment. This could encourage Zawahiri to make an example out of Joulani in order to encourage other al-Qaeda affiliates to adopt Zawahiri’s model.
Joulani has repeatedly justified his adherence to al Qaeda’s ideology on the basis of values that appeal to Syrian and international audiences. Joulani has conducted two major interviews with al-Jazeera since creating JN in 2011. He leveraged both as a platform to put forth a narrative that links al-Qaeda to the will of the people, in accordance with Zawahiri’s vision.
In his first interview in December 2013, Joulani explained how JN’s contributions to the Syrian revolution against Bashar al-Assad demonstrate al-Qaeda’s commitment to defending Muslims against repressive regimes empowered by the West.
The interview followed months of upheaval within the jihadist community in Syria caused by an attempt by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, to absorb JN into a newly declared Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in April 2013. Joulani instead pledged allegiance to Zawahiri in May 2013 and sought his intervention to mediate the growing fitna, or schism, between JN and ISIS in Syria.
Joulani’s interview was therefore a strong signal to Zawahiri and the community of al-Qaeda supporters that Joulani was committed to al-Qaeda’s vision and methodology. The interview simultaneously reassured Syrian audiences of JN’s commitment to defeating the Assad regime, which Joulani characterized as a natural extension of JN’s affiliation to al-Qaeda.
More recently, in a two-part interview with al-Jazeera in May and June 2015, Joulani reassured a Syrian viewership of JN’s continued commitment to overthrowing Assad as the organization begins to consolidate its influence over rebel military and governance structures. Joulani clearly articulated his vision of JN’s place within the history of jihad, nesting the Syrian war against Assad within a historical effort to defend and restore Muslim glory.
He stated that JN’s war in Syria is part of an “inherited jihad” that began after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, tying JN to the earliest founders of al-Qaeda’s ideology. JN later released a 43-minute long video on June 26 titled “Heirs of Glory” that explained the history of al Qaeda’s jihad beginning with the prophet Mohammed and extending to JN’s current war in Syria.
The video, which included English subtitles, was the clearest and most comprehensive articulation of JN’s worldview to date and reinforced Joulani’s message conveyed through al-Jazeera. In both interviews, Joulani demonstrated an ability to nest his local military activity against the Assad regime within a rhetorical narrative that generates support for al-Qaeda without weakening his position in Syria.
The future of al Qaeda?
Joulani’s ability to communicate to both the global jihadist community and to his own Syrian constituency is a strong signal of his potential value to Zawahiri in a global environment currently dominated by ISIS showmanship.
A second strategic objective that Zawahiri could achieve by choosing to elevate Joulani is the integration of Syria’s new, networked generation of foreign fighters into the global al-Qaeda organization.
Joulani currently holds guardianship over a formative foreign fighter experience within the Syrian Civil War. This experience could rival Afghanistan’s mujahideen period that ushered forward al-Qaeda’s first major fighting network.
The Syrian war against Assad continues to provide a crucial testing ground for new waves of foreign fighters that are honing their military skills and developing high-value networks alongside JN and other Salafist jihadist brigades in Syria. These fighters are an important form of capital that provides long-term potential for future expansion and further globalization of the al-Qaeda network.
The network of relationships formed among these foreign fighters during the war in Syria will likely define their evolution in coming decades. Joulani began to highlight the involvement of foreign fighters within JN’s rank and file in November 2014, a fact that he had previously downplayed in favor of establishing a Syrian image. This likely indicates that JN faces growing pressure to compete with ISIS for the allegiance of foreign fighter recruits in the aftermath of ISIS’s declaration of a caliphate on June 29, 2014. It is therefore likely a strategic consideration for both Joulani and Zawahiri to ensure this network adheres to al-Qaeda as it evolves.
The third strategic objective that elevating Joulani to leadership in al-Qaeda could accomplish is to position al Qaeda to more effectively compete with ISIS for leadership in the global jihadist movement. Joulani occupies a unique position that Zawahiri can leverage to compete with ISIS, both because of JN’s geographical proximity to ISIS and also because of its organizational success.
Joulani has proven his ability to navigate a complex and hostile relationship with ISIS, rendering him a potential asset for Zawahiri as al-Qaeda increases its competition with ISIS. Joulani pursues a long-term strategy of competition with ISIS that exchanges immediate and flashy military victories and religious claims in return for the acquisition of a high level of local support that will ultimately secure al-Qaeda’s staying power for generations to come.
JN’s strategy against ISIS is therefore a further manifestation of Joulani’s adherence to Zawahiri’s paradigm for jihad.
Jennifer Cafarella is a Syria research analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.
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