This report is authored by Jessica Lewis McFate, Kimberly Kagan, Jennifer Cafarella, Christopher Kozak, Theodore Bell, and Harleen Gambhir.
The purpose of this intelligence forecast is to outline ISW’s assessment of the most likely and most dangerous courses of action for the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to pursue during Ramadan (June 17, 2015 to July 17, 2015).
For the past three years, ISIS has conducted major offensive operations during the Ramadan holy month, accomplishing its major annual campaign objectives. Its predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), had historically also elevated violence in Iraq during Ramadan.
ISIS is therefore likely preparing a surge of operations to try to achieve important campaign objectives. ISIS can also be expected to commemorate its declaration of a Caliphate on the first full day of Ramadan 2014 by trying to build upon or surpass its declaration of the caliphate last year. ISIS could do so by accomplishing new military objectives, striking religious targets, or announcing a new political milestone.
Regardless, ISIS is likely to begin and end Ramadan with attempted spectacular military offensive actions in Iraq and Syria. ISIS’s selection of these targets would presuppose the defeat of the militaries currently defending those cities or their redeployment to other objectives in ways that leave the capitals vulnerable.
ISIS may therefore attempt to collapse the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian Arab Army over the course of its 2015 campaign, possibly before Ramadan, though more likely over the course of 2015.
ANNIVERSARY OF THE DECLARATION OF THE ISIS CALIPHATE
The beginning of Ramadan 2015 marks the first anniversary of ISIS’s caliphate, which it declared following the fall of Mosul on June 10 and numerous subsequent military victories in Iraq. ISIS will likely try to mark the anniversary by building upon or surpassing its declaration of the caliphate last year. ISIS could do so by accomplishing new military objectives, striking religious targets, or announcing a new political milestone.
ISIS’s actions during Ramadan 2015 will be aimed at amplifying its strategic messaging. These messages may highlight one of several discrete objectives: that the caliphate remains (which theme ISIS has already stated and achieved); that the caliphate is a legitimate successor to those of old and has a new capital to prove it; that sectarian and religious war is accelerating and that all Muslims must mobilize; and that ISIS is expanding militarily.
1. The caliphate remains.
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No ground force has successfully challenged the whole of ISIS’s physical territory. ISIS is likely to emphasize that its claim to the caliphate stands because it does not face an existential threat. In fact, it has expanded territorially and in terms of its followers.
It is possible that ISIS does not need to demonstrate a greater accomplishment before Ramadan, and instead will simply boast of this achievement. Numerous ISIS public statements emphasize that its strategic goal is “to remain and expand;” ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi spoke of the caliphate remaining as a major objective in his 2014 Ramadan speech. ISIS is likely to claim this phased victory loudly at the start of Ramadan.
ISIS may attempt new military or spectacular attacks to underscore this message, but it is possible that ISIS will not conduct new attacks before Ramadan because it has already accomplished its stated objective to remain.
2. ISIS seizes a historic capital.
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ISIS’s caliphate includes several great cities, particularly Mosul, from which Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS declared the caliphate one year ago. ISIS may proclaim a capital there. There are, however, capitals of historic caliphates within ISIS’s current reach inside Iraq and Syria.
Specifically, ISIS may desire to claim Samarra, Baghdad, or Damascus, all capitals of previous caliphates. These cities are hardened targets that are protected by state militaries with significant Iranian augmentation, as well as other alliances. ISIS’s selection of these targets would presuppose the defeat of the militaries currently defending those cities or their redeployment to other objectives in ways that leave the capitals vulnerable.
ISIS may therefore attempt to collapse the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian Arab Army over the course of its 2015 campaign, possibly before Ramadan, though more likely over the course of 2015.
3. ISIS stokes regional sectarian or religious war.
ISIS may attempt to accelerate the regional sectarian war by targeting Shi’a religious holy sites with spectacular attacks, especially in Karbala, Najaf, and Samarra in Iraq. AQI’s destruction of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra in February 2006 dramatically accelerated sectarian violence in Iraq.
ISIS attempted to reach Samarra in its 2014 ground offensive and Karbala and Najaf in its terrorist campaign. As Ramadan is a religious holiday, pilgrims from all over Iraq go to the shrines, making them vulnerable to infiltration by ISIS. ISIS is also present in areas proximate to the shrine cities from which it could stage attacks. The ISF, Iran, and its proxies are likely to have to balance counteroffensive operations elsewhere in Iraq against these positions.
ISIS will also likely target Shi’a populations outside of Iraq and Syria, particularly in Yemen and Saudi Arabia and possibly further abroad.
4. ISIS attacks to maintain its military momentum or to expand.
It is also possible that ISIS will designate its next military objectives in conjunction with Ramadan simply to consolidate its gains, expand its territory, or set conditions for its next annual campaign. Momentum is a critical component of ISIS’s current campaign, though it essentially supports ISIS’s defensive objective to remain in the face of many adversaries.
ISIS may seek limited military objectives before or during Ramadan 2015 simply to maintain its momentum rather than launching new campaign objectives. Alternatively, ISIS may attack in order to begin a new phase of conquest and consolidation.
To determine which of these forecasted objectives ISIS may attempt, ISW used the traditional techniques of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). IPB is a process of analyzing enemy forces, terrain, weather, and civilian considerations in order to anticipate their effects upon friendly forces and their planned or ongoing operations.
In the context of a known and cogent adversary, IPB involves analysis of the adversary’s possible courses of action, given existing knowledge about the adversary’s capabilities, tactics, and intent. Courses of action are ranked from most to least likely and evaluated for the dangers that they potentially pose to friendly force operations.
The purpose of enemy course of action projection is to inform decision-makers with accurate forecasts that adequately account for a range of possibilities as well as the outside risk of most dangerous courses of action. Most dangerous courses of action are designated as such because they are not most likely, but they are nevertheless plausible. Illuminating them allows commanders to mitigate risk while planning in the context of most likely courses of action.
ISW has previously assessed the battlefields in which ISIS is engaged, including Iraq and Syria. It has also assessed ISIS’s capabilities, limitations, disposition, and intent from the openly available sources. These assessments inform this product.
The following scenarios will explore the most likely and most dangerous scenarios that ISIS could execute before and during Ramadan 2015 in pursuit of some or all of these strategic objectives. The scenarios consider ISIS’s possible actions in Iraq, Syria, the Near Abroad (historical caliphate lands in the Middle East, North Africa, Caucasus, and Southwest Asia), and the Far Abroad.
ISIS has spoken of and begun acting upon most of the concepts of operations described below.
ISIS’S MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION (MLCOA): MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO THROUGH RAMADAN 2015
ISIS’s most likely course of action through the end of Ramadan 2015 is to continue its current military campaign in Iraq, Syria, and abroad, while claiming victory as an uncontested and expanding caliphate during its first year.
ISIS’s current campaign, which included major operations at Ramadi, Baiji, and Palmyra, allows ISIS to maintain momentum, demonstrate that it has not been degraded by anti-ISIS efforts, claim a message of victory, and set conditions for future campaign phases. ISIS will likely make a formal announcement to this effect at the start or during Ramadan 2015.
ISIS will also likely maximize its opportunities to dismantle competing militaries in Iraq and Syria to demonstrate that its caliphate will be unrivaled in the years to come. ISIS will likely continue to attempt to show the futility of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition and try to break its will to fight.
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ISIS’S MOST DANGEROUS COURSE OF ACTION (MDCOA): ISIS INITIATES A NEW CAMPAIGN TO SEIZE HISTORIC CALIPHATE CAPITALS, PROVOKE REGIONAL WAR, AND FORCE THE WEST TO END MILITARY ACTION
ISIS’s most dangerous course of action in the next six weeks is a transition to a new phase in its campaign by escalating attacks against religious or political targets that alter the calculus of strong states in the region and abroad.
It is possible that ISIS will mark its first anniversary as a caliphate by sowing seeds for regional disorder, marked with spectacular and surprise attacks upon targets that have hitherto been assessed by ISW to be outside the realm of likely action by ISIS.
In particular, ISIS may attempt to spark a regional sectarian war, as indicators of this regional vulnerability are widely presenting in Syria and Yemen as Arab states and Iran confront one another Actions may include attacks against Shi’a religious sites and actions against military sites with U.S. or Western allied personnel to cause them to end their involvement in the mid-term.
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