The meeting on Syria that Russia intends to organize in Moscow later this month is, predictably, proving to be a complete fiasco.
The Russians had planned to bring together members of the Syrian opposition National Coalition, along with other regime-tolerated and regime-fabricated “oppositionists,” in order to hold a general dialogue with Assad regime representatives.
The Russian move was rightly met with suspicion among certain backers of the Syrian opposition. French official sources saw it as a dubious, opportunistic move, timed to capitalize on Washington’s preoccupation with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in order to push a new, transparently pro-Assad initiative.
Meanwhile, commentary in Saudi media correctly identified Russia’s agenda to do away with any notion of a transition away from Assad. In addition, there was general consensus that the Russian gambit also aimed to divide and dilute the opposition. And so, on Monday, Khaled Khoja, the newly-elected president of the National Coalition all but ruled out his group’s participation in the Russian-sponsored meeting.
But where is Riyadh’s and Paris’ American ally in all this? Far from registering its objection to Russia’s machinations there’s much to suggest that Washington is actually much closer to Moscow on Syria than is commonly realized.
The White House’s stated priorities in Syria align it increasingly with Russia and Iran.
Rehabilitating Assad
Last Saturday, Western diplomatic sources in Paris described as “neutral” the American position on the Russian-sponsored initiative. That the US does not have a clear position toward an initiative advanced by one of Assad’s enablers is bad enough. But in truth, the seemingly passive White House position actually has quite a bit in common with the Kremlin.
Going back to the ill-fated Geneva II conference, in which the opposition and the regime were brought together to begin talks on how to settle the conflict, the Russians’ objective has been to redefine the Syrian issue as one of “fighting terrorism.”
In this framework, Moscow seeks to rehabilitate the Assad regime as a partner in the war on terrorism. Fighting groups like ISIS is the top priority, the Russians maintain, and this needs to be done in cooperation with Assad.
Russia wants to impose this priority on the political talks it wishes to sponsor, thereby redefining their purpose to Assad’s advantage. The reported text of the Russian invitation to Syrian figures explicitly makes this point, as it notes its aim to “unify efforts to combat terrorists and extremists.”
Self-styled “oppositionist” Haitham Mannaa, of the problematic National Coordination Committee, and one of the invitees to Moscow, confirmed this agenda in a recent interview. Echoing Russian and regime talking points, Mannaa told the pro-Iranian Al-Mayadeen TV: “What is the basis of a political solution? First, fighting terrorism.”
What’s curious about these Russian priorities is the extent to which they dovetail with White House talking points — especially post-Geneva II. After that conference went nowhere, the US emphasis shifted to fighting terrorism and a humanitarian cessation of hostilities.
A year-end statement posted on the Facebook page of the US Embassy in Damascus perfectly illustrated this shift. The statement defined the US role as leading efforts “to meet humanitarian needs, defeat ISIL, and foster a peaceful resolution to the conflict.”
Nothing in there about removing Assad.
Russia, too, is using the veneer of humanitarian aid and has expressed its backing for the problematic “freeze” plan proposed by UN peace envoy Staffan De Mistura. As I have shown, the White House has put out similar talking points about the need for “de-escalation” in Syria.
The recent report about White House senior officials, such as Robert Malley, meeting with controversial journalist Nir Rosen and distributing his pro-Assad paper, which bears much resemblance to De Mistura’s plan, further supports my contention.
The White House emphasis on “de-escalation,” much like De Mistura’s “freeze” plan, shelves all discussion about Assad.
Washington Drifts Into The Pro-Assad Camp
There are additional questions about possible US pressure on the National Coalition to attend the Moscow talks, as NOW contributor Hussain Abdul-Hussain reported on Tuesday. This claim dovetails with what the Western diplomatic sources told Al-Hayat.
They disclosed that the US was encouraging the Egyptian effort to bring the National Coalition and the Coordination Committee to agree on a position paper they could then take to Moscow. US backing of Cairo’s endeavor is itself problematic, especially as the Egyptians were publicly criticized in the Saudi media last week over their position on Syria. And this wasn’t the first time such criticism was aired.
In October, after rumors surfaced of an Egyptian effort to soften the Saudi position on Assad, influential columnist Abdul Rahman al-Rashed penned a strong piece shutting the door on such a proposition and politely putting Egypt in its place. Then again last month, Al-Rashed advised the Syrian opposition not to waste its time with the Russians.
In contrast, we know that the White House has been trying to push Riyadh toward an accommodation with Tehran and Moscow over Syria. President Obama said so rather explicitly last November: “The various players involved, as well as the regional players — Turkey, Iran, Assad’s patrons like Russia — are going to have to engage in a political conversation.”
In other words, the White House has hardly been “neutral” when it comes to Assad’s enablers in Russia and Iran. Throughout the Syrian conflict, the Obama administration has found itself repeatedly on the side of the Russians and Iranians against its traditional allies.
Today, Washington’s priorities of fighting terrorism and “de-escalating” the conflict with Assad align it ever more closely with Moscow and Tehran.
Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He tweets @AcrossTheBay
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