Is Turkey still a Western ally? Some observers of the dramatic battle just over its border with Syria, in the town of Kobani, have begun to wonder.
Ankara has steadfastly resisted pressure from Washington to join the alliance attacking Islamic State (IS) forces in Kobani, and has denied the coalition use of its territory and air bases for military operations against IS. Relenting to pressure on Monday, the country announced it would allow some Kurdish peshmerga fighters through its territory into Syria.
But Turkey is still very reluctant to join the battle on its border. Here are five big reasons why.
1. Turkey’s Leader Doesn’t Trust The West
“[The Western countries] suck petrol from the lands of the Middle East as if sipping through a straw,” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan thundered in a speech last week at Istanbul’s Marmara University.
“Do you think they come for peace with their planes and their missiles?” he asked his audience. “No. They do it to get the petrol wells under their protection.”
Since the Syrian civil war began in 2011, Ankara has made no secret of its dissatisfaction with the West’s response. But Turkey’s ambivalence — or even hostility — toward the campaign against IS now is raising eyebrows.
Politico ran an op-ed last week asking whether it was “time to kick Turkey out of NATO?”
“If you look at Turkey without knowing anything about the international context, you would look at Ankara’s rhetoric and you would never think that this was a NATO country,” says Cengiz Candar, a Turkish columnist for Radikal newspaper.
But Turkey’s unwillingness to face off with the United States’ new public enemy No. 1 almost certainly will not spell the end of its 70-year-old membership in NATO, or of its close co-operation with the West. In fact, populist anti-American sentiments, geared toward a domestic audience, have been “in the DNA” of Turkish politicians for decades, according to Candar.
2. Turkey's Ties With The West Have Always Been Complicated
The conflicts in Syria and Iraq have highlighted deep differences in national interests and priorities and have brought the Turkish political tradition of anti-Western rhetoric to the fore.
“All leaders before Erdogan have also tried to create the perception that they are not in the pocket of Western powers,” according to Candar. “It goes back to the 19th century when the Ottoman Empire was a fading imperial power.”
Hugh Pope of the International Crisis Group, a former journalist who has followed events in Turkey for 30 years, recalls several past occasions when Turkey and the West were on even worse terms.
Following Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus, the US imposed an arms embargo. The most recent spell of serious tension came in 2003 during the lead-up to the Iraq war, when Turkey’s parliament voted against supporting the US-led coalition.
“I would say there’s a new edge to their rhetoric,” says Pope, “and it’s partly because of the pressure that’s being put on Turkey to join the anti-IS coalition.”
“It’s showing ambivalence towards the West because so much of what the West is asking Turkey to do runs counter to its own interests.”
3. Turkey And The US Have Different Priorities In Syria
While the US and its allies have become obsessed with IS, Turkey is wary of engaging in military action in Syria — with which it shares a 900-kilometer border — unless there is a broader strategy aimed at ending its bloody civil war.
For Ankara, that means removing the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, which it regards as the ultimate source of Syria’s woes. The US, meanwhile, has no wish to embark on regime change.
Also unlike the US, Turkey is hostile toward the Kurdish forces fighting IS in Syria.
The Popular Protection Units (YPG) are the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the rebel force that has fought a 30-year insurgency against Turkey, and which the country still views as its main security threat.
“The priority for them is twofold: the downfall of the Assad regime, and the prevention of any semblance of Kurdish self-rule in Syria,” says Candar.
4. Not Everyone In Turkey Hates ISIS
IS — whose siege of Kobani is indirectly helping Turkey suppress Kurdish autonomy in Syria, and whose defeat would aid Assad — attracts sympathy among a section of Erdogan’s conservative Sunni support base.
On Oct.14, the coach of an Istanbul football team was attacked after trying to protect a member of his training team from a mob of fans who were angry the player had posted anti-IS and pro-Kurdish messages on his Facebook page.
In a survey by polling firm Metropoll in mid-September, 25 percent of Justice and Development Party (AKP) respondents said Turkey should not cooperate against IS with regional and world powers.
“In the context of a sectarian war, many see IS as a Sunni element achieving success against other sectarian and ethnic groups,” says Candar.
5. Turkey’s Relationship With The West Is Changing
Turkey’s belligerence may also reflect a shift in how it views its relationship with the West, according to Behlul Ozkan, assistant professor of political science at Istanbul’s Bogazici University.
“During the Cold War Turkey behaved as a satellite of the West, but the current government want to change this, they want to use their relationship with the West in order to maximize their own interests.”
This approach is reflected in Ankara’s policies in Syria and Iraq, where it is keen to act in concert with the West, says Ozkan, but only willing to do so on its own terms.
“In the AKP [the ruling party] and particularly in the circle around Erdogan, there’s a belief that Turkey should have good ties with the US,” says Ozkan. “There’s this anti-American rhetoric, but that’s all it is.”
Ultimately, the United States and Turkey’s other Western allies may simply have to accept a more confident and a more prickly Turkey, and to accept Erdogan’s nationalist showboating with a pinch of salt.
“There should be an acceptance that Turkey isn’t always going to necessarily jump the same way as its Western allies,” says Pope, “any more than Britain always jumps the same way as the EU.”