America has put the band back together.
Around 40 nations are contributing to the fight against ISIS, although who those 40 nations are or what each one is actually contributing remains a mystery.
In addition to American air power, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and even Belgium have either begun launching air operations or are preparing to join the fight in Iraq — the only caveat to their participation being that they will, for now at least, limit the scope of their operations to Iraq and only Iraq.
The United States has been joined in air operations against ISIS in Syria by a Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar. However, it remains to be seen if they will continue to be part of a sustained campaign or if their participation in the initial air strikes was a one-off event.
Still, the fact that the Obama administration managed to get that many Arab states — in particular the ever-at-odds Saudis and Qataris — to openly join in military operations against an extremist Islamist group based in another Arab country is no mean feat.
No President has managed to get the Arab states on board like that since George H.W. Bush put together his coalition to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991.
Making sure that the anti-ISIS campaign was not the sole preserve of the West was not just important from a public relations or messaging perspective. It's at least tacit recognition by the Arab states and the Gulf kingdoms in particular that they do indeed have an interest in actively and openly fighting back against extremist Islamists in the region — extremist Islamists that some of these states they have had a role in the birth, development, and spread of over the years.
The coalition has launched hundreds of airstrikes, targeting ISIS bases, depots, heavy weapons, and convoys (as well as some belonging to the Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat an-Nusra) since operations began with American attacks on August 7th.
This growing coalition and the increasing scope of the campaign have, since those first airstrikes, managed to accomplish just short of anything at all.
If that wasn’t clear enough, here it is again: American-led airstrikes have done nothing to stop ISIS. Nothing.
Not All They're Cracked Up To Be
President Obama and other coalition leaders may point to the somewhat stabilized situation around the Kurdish areas of Iraq, or at how the Yazidis and other minorities weren’t completely wiped out during the ISIS blitz. Kurdish forces have made some gains, retaking the Mosul Dam and recapturing Rabia, a strategic town on the border with Syria.
No attempt has yet been made to retake Mosul, though, and for every loss in the north, ISIS has made gains somewhere else.
They have consolidated their hold on Anbar province, taking the city of Hit on the Euphrates. ISIS now has almost complete control of the Euphrates between Syria and Baghdad, the exception being the strategically vital Haditha Dam.
This area, stretching from the outskirts of Baghdad to the border crossing town of Al-Qaim, was the focus of a series of clearing operations by the US military as it battled the post-invasion insurgency last decade. When “the Surge” was put into place in 2007, many of the reinforcements went to this area. And when American forces withdrew, the area reverted to its status as a center of anti-government activity and a Ho-Chi-Minh trail of sorts for smuggling and terrorist activity.
For every Kurdish victory, there has been another defeat for Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the Baghdad area. Repeated attempts at retaking Ramadi have been repelled, with the ISF barely making it to the outskirts of the city at best.
Hundreds of Iraqi troops went missing on September 21st after ISIS overran an an Army base called Camp Saqlawiyah in Anbar province. Most of them are believed to be dead. The attack shattered the Iraqi 30th Brigade, the latest government unit to be broken since Mosul fell in June. A number of heavy weapons and armored vehicles fell into the hands of the terrorist group.
One report even broke the dramatic news that Baghdad may now even be within the range of heavy artillery belonging to ISIS.
Despite the call-up of thousands of Shi’a militiamen, troops from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Qods Force, and the support of American air strikes, the ISF has been unable to put up much of a fight against ISIS.
The fight against the group in Syria is not doing all that much better, as the group continues its advance in just about every direction. Its opponents, whether its the army of President Bashar al-Assad, the anti-Assad Free Syrian Army, the Kurds, or others, have continued to lose ground.
The Stakes In Kobane
Nowhere is the situation more dire than in the town of Kobane.
Located right on the Turkish border in the predominately Kurdish region of northeastern Syria, Kobane has been the focus of a ferocious ISIS offensive that has sent over 130,000 refugees streaming over the border. In their place, thousands of military-age Kurdish men have been trying to get to Kobane from the Turkish side of the border, but many have been blocked by reinforced Turkish troops at the border.
Kobane’s fall would not just represent a major loss in the fight against ISIS, but a humanitarian catastrophe and a huge political crisis for Turkey.
One of now-President Erdogan’s initiatives in the run-up to his presidential election was to begin a peace process with Turkey’s Kurds. Led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, better known as the PKK, the Kurds and the Turkish government have been locked in a struggle that has gone on for four decades now and has cost thousands of lives.
Progress was made to the point that the PKK’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, declared a ceasefire. Since then, the full resources of the Kurds have been devoted to fighting in Syria and Iraq.
The siege of Kobane threatens the fragile ceasefire. Ocalan and the PKK leadership were already deeply angered by what they saw as Erdogan’s drop in interest in the peace process after his victory at the polls, but they have also made it clear that they will end the ceasefire if Kobane falls.
Turkey could have scored some easy points with the Kurds by easing their passage to Kobane, but instead have blocked them and even clashed with Kurdish protesters on the border, a mere mile at most from the city where their people are under attack.
Air Power Just Isn't Enough
Kobane represents two major problems with the American-led fight against ISIS. The first is the ineffective air campaign. It can’t be argued convincingly that the air strikes are having a deleterious effect on ISIS, not when Kobane is under siege and Baghdad is possibly within artillery range. In the north, where Iraqi Kurds are having some success against ISIS, air power has been an aid to ground forces, but not a silver bullet.
Contrary to popular belief, both the intervention in Bosnia and the later one in Kosovo show the inadequacy of air power in forcing real change in the situation on the ground or in the thinking of an opponent. Both required ground forces to bring a satisfactory conclusion.
In Libya, air power helped stop an offensive by Ghaddafi’s army, but it wasn’t until the rebels on the ground got their own forces together that victory was had (although we’ve all seen that that victory has been looking like lately).
The coalition air campaign, as it stands today, is wholly inadequate. Pinprick air strikes just aren’t enough.
In Iraq, the ISF and Kurdish forces need actual on-call air support. F/A-18s are great, but A-10 ground attack aircraft and attack helicopters, like Apaches or Mi-24s, would be even better. A-10s and attack helicopters are suited to hanging around above a battle, coming down as needed to provide heavy support for ground forces. In Syria, Kurdish forces at Kobane could use similar support — although at this point, anything would be helpful.
Again, though, the limitations of air power of any kind are clear. Friendly forces on the ground need to be trained and equipped. Unless the United States wants to completely cede support for the ISF to Iran, it should either do the job itself or find a coalition member to help. Jordan, as has been discussed before, has a skilled professional military that could provide valuable training and command support. With the Kurds, the United States can and should take a direct role in training and equipping Kurdish forces. The US should also speed up the shipment of heavy weapons and especially anti-armor weapons to the Kurds.
What about support for Kobane, and forces in Syria in general? That brings up the second problem with the fight against ISIS: Turkey.
The Turkish Obstacle
President Erdogan’s Turkey has been manic, to say the least, on action against ISIS. Erdogan was the first regional leader to call for Assad’s ouster when the Syrian Civil War first started, and Turkey opened its border to those looking to head south into Syria. As the situation in Syria deteriorated, Turkey found itself in a very uncomfortable position.
The country’s intelligence agency, the MIT, reportedly confessed that it really can’t monitor or control ISIS in Turkey. Not to mention the incredible amount of smuggling that goes on at the border, or the very plain fact that Turkish buyers are loading up on oil smuggled from Syria and Iraq even from areas under ISIS control.
Yet Turkey has been loath to accommodate Kurds wishing to join the fight against ISIS in Kobane, a town so close to the border that people can literally sit at the border fence and watch the battle unfold. ISIS is intent on pushing right up to that fence.
Despite the Turkish parliament granting permission for Turkey to both host operations in Syria and Iraq — as well as perform operations in both countries on its own — there is no sign that they are about to do anything.
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu proclaimed that Turkey will “do whatever we can” to prevent Kobane from falling. Events haven't bore this out. Then again, Davutoglu did say after those remarks that the Kurds at Kobane were paying the price for their leadership not working with the Free Syrian Army “instead of cooperating with the [Assad] regime.”
Fighting ISIS isn’t even a priority for Turkey. As Erdogan himself said, Turkey’s first priority is setting up a no-fly zone.
Erdogan remains focused on deposing Assad, whereas the United States and the coalition it leads are focused on fighting ISIS. This basic difference of priorities could be holding up Turkish action.
If the United States wants Erdogan to move, it might have to do something it is deeply reluctant to do: formulate a real policy on what it wants to do about Assad.
Turkey could instantly turn the tide of the battle for Kobane with artillery and local air support. It could at least let Kurds cross the border to fight ISIS.
When it comes to fighting ISIS, more is needed, and it’s needed now.
Garrett Khoury, a graduate of the George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs and an MA Candidate at Tel Aviv University, is the Director of Research and Content for The Eastern Project.
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